AI can do this concept much more justice simply because of the fact that TRP are conflates a lot of separate concepts/mechanisms into one and it becomes incoherent fast.

1) Evaluative autonomy (intrapsychic)

Where the terminating judgment lives. The named constructs:

Locus of evaluation (Rogers): whose assessment closes the question — yours or the room's. Self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1996): the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable. This is the operationalized version of your "hesitation." Low SCC predicts susceptibility to social influence, higher neuroticism, and — relevant to your point — difficulty identifying one's own preferences, not just asserting them. Differentiation of self (Bowen): capacity to maintain autonomous functioning while remaining in emotional contact. This is the closest existing construct to your "single mental point of origin," and it's better than your formulation in one specific way: Bowen classifies both fusion (absorbing others' reality) and emotional cutoff (impermeability) as low differentiation. The narcissist you lived with scores low, not high, on the construct you were trying to extract from him. His imperviousness is produced by a deficit in mentalization — an inability to hold the other's perspective as authoritative — not by a surplus of self-definition. Superficially identical output, opposite generator.

2) Definitional control (dyadic/group)

Who gets to name what the situation is. This is your police/norms point and it's the best-supported part of what you've said:

Definition of the situation (W.I. Thomas) and frame analysis (Goffman) — the second blog post is essentially unattributed Goffman, and it's a reasonable rendering. Lukes' third face of power: power operates at three levels — winning decisions, controlling the agenda, and shaping preferences so the conflict never arises. Your "controls what's ok and not ok" is the third face precisely. Doxa (Bourdieu): the taken-for-granted that doesn't have to be argued because it isn't visible as a claim. This is what the blog calls meta-frame, and Bourdieu's version is sharper: the marker of successful definitional control is that it doesn't feel like control. Pluralistic ignorance explains why norm-setters have outsized leverage — most people privately dissent but read others' silence as consent, so the norm holds on a minority's actual belief.

3) Relative dependence (structural)

Who needs the exchange more. This is not psychological at all and it's routinely mistaken for the other two:

Principle of least interest (Waller, 1938): in any dyad, the party less invested in continuation holds more power over its terms. This is the actual academic name for most of what the manosphere calls frame in relationships. Power-dependence theory (Emerson): power of A over B equals dependence of B on A. Fully symmetric, no gender content, no psychology required.

Frame is a rate, not a substance — the rate at which you revise your evaluative standards in response to social pressure relative to the rate at which you revise them in response to evidence. That's measurable in principle, doesn't require metaphysics about the self, and correctly implies that the target isn't zero (immunity is pathology) but a favorable ratio.